Ten central trade union organisations have called for a nationwide strike on May 22 to protest against the “anti-worker and anti-people autocratic measures of the centre” and “the draconian changes in labour laws by state governments to facilitate more brutal and cruel exploitation of workers”. Since 2014, the Central government has been taking a slew of measures aimed at making far-reaching changes to India’s labour laws premised on the grounds that they are antiquated, complicated and an impediment to economic growth. These measures euphemistically referred to as the ‘labour law reforms’ include amendments to the existing laws, the enactment of new laws, codification of the laws and the issue of advisories, model bills and business reform actions plans.

It has been touted that the reforms are necessary to afford more flexibility to employers, facilitate the ease of business and attract greater foreign investment. It has also been claimed that changes to the labour law inspection regime are necessary to free employers from ‘the tyranny of the inspection raj’. Making use of their concurrent powers, several state governments have taken a similar path and introduced changes to the labour laws. The government of Rajasthan had been a forerunner in this regard and had increased the thresholds for the application of the Factories Act, 1948 and the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 in 2014, pushing a large number of workers out of the coverage of those laws.

Trade unions have stridently opposed the ‘labour law reforms’ on the grounds that they undermine the hard-won rights of workers and will lead to greater exploitation of workers. Trade unions have repeatedly charged that the government has been acting unilaterally, without holding tripartite consultations. On account of the stiff resistance of the trade unions, the Central government has been unable to effect the changes at the pace that it would have liked.

Using the health crisis as a pretext

It now appears that the COVID-19 crisis is being used as a pretext to push through the unfinished ‘reforms agenda’ of increasing the hours of work, restricting wages to the bare minimum, reducing social security benefits, permitting the engagement of contract labour for any kind of work, easing norms for firing workers, clamping down on trade union rights and whittling down labour inspection. For close to six years now, the Central government has been attempting to increase the hours of work of factory workers.

Citing a public emergency, the labour departments of Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh and Himachal Pradesh last month simultaneously issued notifications extending the hours of work of factory workers to a maximum of 12 hours a day and 72 hours a week. The notifications have been issued invoking section 5 of the Factories Act and are valid for a period of three months. Around the same time, the labour department of Punjab too issued a similar order under section 65 of the Factories Act as per which factories may be exempted from the stipulation regarding the daily and weekly hours of work under the Act to cope with an exceptional pressure of work. Last week, the governments of Odisha, Maharashtra and Goa had also similarly increased the daily hours of work. The fact that increasing the length of the workday may endanger the health and safety of workers seems to have been entirely overlooked.

The government of Uttar Pradesh has gone much further. The government is in the process of promulgating the Uttar Pradesh Temporary Exemption from Certain Labour Laws Ordinance, 2020 that suspends the operation of all labour laws applicable to factories and manufacturing establishments in the state for a period of three years, with the exception of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, 1976; Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923, the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and provisions in the labour laws relating to women and children. The draft ordinance, however, requires employers to pay the minimum wages notified by the state government and also requires compliance with the provisions of the Factories Act relating to safety. It extends the hours of work to 11 hours a day and the spread over of the workday to 12 hours.

The implication of this is that employers in the state would have no obligation to pay workers anything more than the prescribed minimum wage. They need not adhere to their wage-related obligations under existing collective bargaining agreements. In addition, they would stand divested of their social security obligations. Employers will have total flexibility in the matter of firing workers and can do so without paying them any compensation. They can engage contract workers for any kind of work and run their establishments with an entirely precarious workforce. They need not provide even basic amenities to their workers. They need not have any kind of engagement with trade unions thus depriving workers of any say in their wages and working conditions.

New trade unions cannot be registered in the state for the next three years. Furthermore, workers will not have access to any redressal mechanisms to address their grievances. Such unrestrained flexibility coupled with a total clamp down on the possibility of any kind of resistance from the workers is what employers’ associations across the country are now demanding.

Two weeks ago, the government of Madhya Pradesh had exempted all factories in the state from the application of all the provisions of the Factories Act except those relating to approval, licensing and registration, safety, hazardous processes, overtime wages, earned leave and the obligation of the employer to notify the authorities about accidents that result in death or serious bodily injury. It has permitted third party certification for non-hazardous factories employing less than 50 workers, for a period of three months from the date of publication of the notification.

The implication of this is that the provisions of the Factories Act relating to the maintenance of health and hygiene, provision of basic amenities and labour inspection will not be applicable to factories for a period of three months. The government of Madhya Pradesh has also issued a notification exempting new factories from the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act except those relating to lay off, retrenchment and closure for a period of 1000 days from the date of publication of the notification. This would mean that workers in newly established factories will not be able to exercise their freedom of association and collective bargaining rights for a period of 1000 days.

It has also exempted 11 types of industries from the application of the Madhya Pradesh Industrial Relations Act that contains provisions relating to the recognition of trade unions by employers and this again is a move to curtail trade union rights. Suppression of trade union rights that are democratic rights does not augur well for a democracy.

Following the Uttar Pradesh model, the government of Gujarat is in the process of promulgating an ordinance exempting new units that are set up within a year of its coming into force from the application of all labour laws with the exception of the Minimum Wages Act, the Employees’ Compensation Act and the safety-related provisions of the Factories Act for a period of three years. If the ordinance is promulgated, workers in new units in the manufacturing, as well as service sectors, would be deprived of their rights to fair wages, decent working conditions and social security and their freedom of association and collective bargaining rights as well.

Joining the list of states that are in the process of amending labour laws, the government of Karnataka has proposed to increase the threshold numbers for the application of the Factories Act, the Contract Labour (Regulation and Abolition) Act and Chapter V-B of the Industrial Disputes Act that requires prior government approval for effecting lay off, retrenchment and closure. Increasing the number thresholds under those laws would have the effect of restricting the coverage of those laws which in turn amounts to reducing the protection available to workers under the laws.

Harbinger of things to come

Although it may appear that such measures will be in place only for a limited period of time, they may be a harbinger of things to come and may well become a permanent feature once the waters are tested. While the government may justify such retrograde measures that turn the clock back by over a hundred years claiming that they are necessary to kickstart the economy, attract investment and create employment, the fact is that such measures infringe on the fundamental rights and human rights of workers and cannot be countenanced on any count. Indeed, there is little evidence that such changes to the labour laws result in attracting big investments and boost industrialisation or job creation. Labour rights are human rights and the Indian state cannot abdicate its constitutional obligations and the commitments that it has made by reason of ratifying the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and various Conventions of the ILO as a result of which it is bound to promote decent work in conditions of freedom, equity, security and dignity.

Ramapriya Gopalakrishnan is an advocate specializing in labour law practicing at the Madras High Court.

In the higher judicial system, very rarely has an occasion come when two Chief Justices of India have had to remind the prime minister of something.Alas, two consecutive CJIs – Justice Dipak Misra and Justice Ranjan Gogoi (now a Rajya Sabha member, after having been nominated by the president) – had to remind the Prime Minister’s Office of the allegations against a senior judge of the Allahabad high court, Justice S.N. Shukla.

Specifically, they have had to remind the PMO that the allegations were serious and warranted initiation of proceedings for his removal.Unfortunately, the judge retired on July 17, 2020, without the Union government having taken any action for his impeachment.In July 2019, it was reported that the then CJI Ranjan Gogoi, had, for the first time in history, given permission to the CBI to lodge an FIR against a sitting high court judge. That too, under the Prevention of Corruption Act, for his alleged involvement in the medical college scam.

Even before this, a committee comprising Justice Indira Banerjee, then Chief Justice of the Madras high court and now a Supreme Court judge, Justice S.K. Agnihotri, then Chief Justice of Sikkim high court, and Justice P.K. Jaiswal, judge of the Madhya Pradesh high court, had submitted a report on Justice Shukla dated January 20, 2018. Their report concluded that “the aberrations complained of are serious enough to call for initiation of proceedings for his removal (as a judge)”.

Thus the process required for the initiation of impeachment proceedings stood complete as long ago as January, 2018. Justice Dipak Misra was CJI at the time.In December 2019, the CBI even raided the judge. However, Justice Shukla finally retired on July 17, 2020, having not been assigned any judicial work (under orders of the CJI) for nearly two and a half years. For these two and a half years, the expense of the security and maintenance of the judge and his immediate family has been borne by the public exchequer.

Whenever any constitutional crisis has emerged in the executive function or parliamentary process, the parties concerned expect the judiciary to take up the matter on an urgent basis and the judiciary has always done so on priority, thereby discharging its constitutional responsibility. The previous CJI’s last reminder to the prime minister, almost a year ago, is of similar nature. It requested him to take the process further and discharge his responsibility on a priority basis. But his plea fell on deaf ears.

After Jawaharlal Nehru, Narendra Modi is the second prime minister of the country who has been able to retain power for a second term with a full majority in the Lok Sabha, free of the pressures and demands that coalition partners bring.

This mandate should have been used to uphold constitutional principles, by acting in a uniform and consistent manner and not arbitrarily, as the government has done in the cases of appointment of judges and chief justices of high courts.When Justice K.M. Joseph’s appointment to the Supreme Court was in issue, it was delayed by the Union government for a long time, under the pretext of his all-India seniority of high court judges.

On the other hand, we witnessed a subsequent appointment where similar issues were not raised by the same government and the process was completed in an incredibly short period time. Similarly, for high court appointments, despite the Supreme Court reiterating many appointments for the second time, contrary to the established guidelines in the Second and Third Judges’ cases of the apex court, the same were kept pending, or returned.

In the case of Justice Shukla’s impeachment, the government did not move ahead despite the requests of two consecutive CJIs. In the Indian constitutional set-up, the judiciary can be as independent as it chooses to be and in that exercise of ensuring independence, litigant, citizen and the government all shall have to depend upon and trust the wisdom of the judiciary itself. It can keep external influences emanating from government functionaries as far as it wants.

However, the process of impeachment is not within the ambit of the judiciary. Hence, the concerned institution – parliament – should have undertaken that exercise expeditiously, in a process led by the Centre. However, the government has failed the test of objectivity demanded by the Supreme Court in this regard.

In the past, under similar circumstances, Justices P.D. Dinakaran and Soumitra Sen resigned only when their impeachment motions were put into action. In this case, once Justice Shukla refused to resign, despite the inquiry committee report, the executive should have immediately brought about an impeachment motion. This may have been sufficient cause for the indicted judge to finally resign.

In various judicial pronouncements, it has been repeatedly stated that independence of the judiciary is the sine qua non of democracy. Justice Lokur reiterated in the NJAC judgment in 2015 that, “Basic concepts like democracy, Rule of Law, independence of judiciary all are constituents of basic structure of our constitution.”

Hence, the system cannot keep experimenting with these very basic features of our constitution. Here, the government appears to have successfully experimented with the credibility and dignity of the judiciary. Just as a delay in the appointment of judges has an adverse effect on judicial independence and the rule of law, the government’s inaction in the removal of tainted judges have exactly the same effect.

M.R. Shamshad is an Advocate-on-Record at the Supreme Court of India. Views Expressed here are his personal views.

Rakesh Dwivedi , Senior Advocate, Supreme Court

The sale of liquor has been prohibited by the Central government in exercise of powers under the Disaster Management Act, 2005. The ban raises the question of the expanse of this enactment. How much inflation of ambit would be constitutionally permissible, given that our Constitution is federal in character and involves an elaborate distribution of powers in the Seventh Schedule, as also the fact that except for the exercise of powers under Article 356, the state governments cannot be superseded?

The objective of the Disaster Management Act, 2005, is to deal with disasters, their impact, and all steps necessary to alleviate, remedy and rehabilitate. The object limits the ambit of the Act. It does not matter how wide the phraseology of the provisions is. The object or purpose of the Act sets the limit. Purposive construction is today’s golden rule of interpretation, Justice RF Nariman observed in Shailesh Dhairyawan v Mohan Balkrishna (2016).

That being so, can the Central government prohibit the sale of liquor even though the sale of essential and non-essential goods has been permitted? Let us look at the three lists in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Entry 8 of List 2, the State list, read with Article 246, gives exclusive power to the states to legislate and execute with respect to the manufacture, production, distribution and sale of liquor. The Central government has no power in this respect. It cannot encroach upon the legislative domain of the states. How then does the Disaster Management Act empower the Centre to impose a temporary ban on the sale of liquor during the fight the coronavirus pandemic?

The Centre can rest its case on entry 29 of List 3 which enables it to deal with the epidemic. It may bring in the residuary entry 97 in List 1, Parliament’s exclusive domain, to deal with disasters. But these entries are limited to managing the epidemic and disasters. The residuary entry operates only when there are no express entries in any list. Neither of these entries would displace entry 8 of List 2. The Centre can prohibit all sales or some sales, if necessary, to deal with the pandemic disaster. But if retail and wholesale sales of essential articles as well as non-essentials and food deliveries are allowed, can the retailers be prevented from supplying liquor?

It is difficult to comprehend how the home delivery of liquor, particularly foreign liquor or IMFL, would result in the spread of coronavirus. It is a non-essential commodity which can be supplied to homes on demand after wearing masks and gloves.

Notably, the supply of liquor presents a vital source of revenue, along with VAT, or sales tax. The states need funds to remain functional and to discharge their duties, even those with respect to Covid-19. Managing a pandemic disaster brings in elements of centralisation in an otherwise federal framework of our constitutional governance, but only to enable the Central government to deal with the pandemic. The Disaster Management Act, 2005, cannot totally disrupt the states’ plenary jurisdiction as a federal partner. In fact, this enactment is itself carrying a federal structure for dealing with the pandemic. If, however, the goods to be supplied are selected for prohibition, irrespective of linkage to pandemic management or proximate nexus with it or the classification and selection of goods for continued prohibition is palpably arbitrary, then it becomes unconstitutional.

The prohibition of liquor supply is in exercise of an executive power under the Disaster Management Act. The executive needs to satisfy the rationality and proportionality test. In this case, the continued ban on supply of liquor, in any form, even if the supplier is willing to comply with the precautionary norms and is in a position to do so, is clearly and manifestly arbitrary.

There is no justification for treating it differently from other non-essentials. There seems to be an oversight that this good is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the states and its sale is much needed for the revenue of a state. It adversely impacts the state’s economy as well as the fight against the pandemic.

It is said that there is domestic violence on account of the consumption of liquor. If allowed in the present times, it would increase violence. But this is a matter for the states to consider for imposing a permanent ban. It is not a disaster management issue. It is said the poor would divert his little income to liquor. For this reason, the whole society should be deprived, else there would be a charge of discrimination. This, too, is for the states to consider while devising excise policy and rules. It may temporarily withhold supply of country liquor or raise its prices.

Assuming there is power micro-managing, selection of products by the Central government is not a good idea. The states execute at the ground level and the situation of coronavirus spread in each state is different. Even within the states, there are areas where there is little or no impact or the situation is getting better. Hence, at the micro level, the states should be left free to decide for themselves. It may be noted that the financial condition of the states is grim.

The excise duty source needs to be revived. This will also help the Centre as the demand from the states for funds will reduce. Federal cooperation and federal freedom are essential for the economic revival of India.

( These are independent views of the writer.)

विराग गुप्ता

राजस्थान विधानसभा के स्पीकर ने सुप्रीम कोर्ट से अपनी याचिका वापस ले ली है। अगले कुछ दिनों में हॉर्स ट्रेडिंग और रिसॉर्ट पॉलिटिक्स का कारोबार यदि विफल हो गया तो न्यायिक जंग का नया दौर फिर से शुरू होगा। संविधान की दसवीं अनुसूची में दलबदल विरोधी कानून की धारा 7 के तहत अयोग्यता के मामलों पर, अदालत में सवाल नहीं उठाए जा सकते। लेकिन विधायकों की खेमेबंदी में जब स्पीकर ही पक्षकार बनकर सुप्रीम कोर्ट पहुंच जाएं, तो फिर संवैधानिक प्रावधानों की रक्षा कैसे होगी? कांग्रेस राज में नेहरू के दिनों से ही कैबिनेट प्रणाली की अवहेलना होने के साथ राज्यों में राष्ट्रपति शासन लगाने की शुरुआत हो गई थी।

इंदिरा राज में कठपुतली राज्यपाल और स्पीकर की नियुक्ति के साथ न्यायपालिका को नियंत्रित करने की अधोगामी परंपराओं की शुरुआत हुई। सत्ता के इस राजस्थानी मैच में तीन नए तरीकों से लोकतंत्र और संविधान को और भी कमजोर किया गया है। उत्साही स्पीकर ने सदन के बाहर कथित व्हिप के उल्लंघन के लिए सचिन पायलट गुट के विधायकों के खिलाफ तुरंत नोटिस जारी कर दिया। ऐसे मामलों में अंतरिम राहत की बजाय संवैधानिक बिंदुओं पर फैसला होता है।

लेकिन हाईकोर्ट ने ताबड़तोड़ सुनवाई करके यथास्थिति के आदेश से स्पीकर को निःशस्त्र कर दिया। स्पष्ट संवैधानिक प्रावधान और सुप्रीम कोर्ट के फैसलों की नजीर के बावजूद, बहुमत वाली गहलोत सरकार की सिफारिश पर विधानसभा सत्र नहीं बुलाकर, राज्यपाल ने भी संवैधानिक अवमूल्यन की नई मिसाल कायम कर दी।

भाजपा के ऊपर कांग्रेस के विधायकों को तोड़ने का आरोप है तो गहलोत भी दूध के धुले नहीं हैं। बसपा के 6 विधायकों को वो पिछले साल कांग्रेस में ला चुके हैं। उप मुख्यमंत्री नाम का संविधान में कोई पद नहीं है। इसके बावजूद अपने ही मंत्री से मुख्यमंत्री की 1.5 वर्षों से चल रही संवादहीनता लोकतंत्र के लिए भयानक त्रासदी है। विधायकों की खरीद-फरोख्त में सभी दलों द्वारा अरबों-खरबों रुपए के निवेश से जाहिर है कि राजनीति सेवा की बजाय व्यापार का सबसे आकर्षक प्लेटफॉर्म है।

सुप्रीम कोर्ट ने वर्ष 2006 के फैसले में इस प्रवृत्ति पर गहरी चिंता जाहिर की थी। इसके बावजूद पैसे के दम पर टिकट हासिल करने और खरीद फरोख्त से दल-बदल के लिए किसी भी नेता को अभी तक दंड नहीं मिला। दोनों पक्षों के नेताओं के खिलाफ पुलिस और सीबीआई की छापेमारी और अवैध टेलीफोन टैपिंग से जाहिर है कि आपराधिक मामलों में क़ानून की बजाय सत्तानशीनों के इशारों पर कार्रवाई शुरू और बंद होती है।

दोनों पक्षों के नेताओं की स्वीकारोक्ति के अनुसार दल बदलने वाले विधायकों की कीमत करोड़ों में है। तो फिर विधायकों की खरीद फरोख्त में शामिल दोनों पार्टियां अदालत के सामने न्याय और नैतिकता की दुहाई कैसे दे सकती हैं? बसपा की राजस्थान इकाई के 6 विधायकों ने कांग्रेस ज्वाइन कर ली, लेकिन इसे बसपा पार्टी का कांग्रेस में विलय कैसे माना जा सकता है? पायलट गुट के विधायकों के खिलाफ स्पीकर ने दल बदल विरोधी कानून की धारा 2 (1) (अ) के तहत जो नोटिस जारी किया है, उससे भी राजनीतिक दलों की सदस्यता, त्यागपत्र और निष्कासन की प्रक्रिया का अहम् मुद्दा सामने आता है।

विधायक और सांसदों को दल बदल से रोकने के लिए 35 साल पहले सन 1985 में जो क़ानून बना, उसमें राजनीतिक दल को व्यापक तरीके से परिभाषित नहीं किया गया। जनप्रतिनिधित्व कानून के तहत चुनाव आयोग द्वारा राजनीतिक दलों का रजिस्ट्रेशन करने के बावजूद चुनाव आयोग इन दलों के लिए नियामक की भूमिका नहीं निभाता। किसी भी सोसाइटी, ट्रस्ट या एनजीओ को पदाधिकारियों तथा सदस्यों का सालाना विवरण जमा करना होता है। लेकिन करोड़ों सदस्यों का दावा करने वाले सभी राजनीतिक दल अपने सदस्यों का ना तो सार्वजनिक रजिस्टर रखते हैं और ना ही इसका ब्योरा चुनाव आयोग के सम्मुख फाइल करते हैं।

देश में हर छोटी बात के लिए क़ानून है, लेकिन राजनीतिक दलों के लिए पूरा मैदान साफ़ होने की वजह से दलों और सरकार का फर्क खत्म हो गया है। इसी वजह से सत्ता का पिरामिड, राजनीतिक दलों के वंशवाद और हाईकमान पर केंद्रित हो गया है।

दलबदल विरोधी कानून इसलिए भी विफल है क्योंकि इसमें पार्टी सदस्यों को दरकिनार करके सिर्फ विधायक या सांसद की संख्या के आधार पर ही दलों का आंकलन हो रहा है। हाईकोर्ट के अंतरिम फैसले के पैरा एल में सुप्रीम कोर्ट की लार्जर बेंच के जिन सात बिंदुओं का जिक्र है, उन्हें 4 साल पहले ही सुप्रीम कोर्ट में जस्टिस गोगोई ने दो पेज के छोटे फैसले से निपटा दिया था, जिसे अब फिर से खोलने की जरूरत है।

सुप्रीम कोर्ट द्वारा दलों को परिभाषित करने के साथ उनकी पारदर्शिता और कानूनी जवाबदेही तय हो तो निचले स्तर तक लोकतंत्र की जड़ें मजबूत होंगी। राजस्थान में सत्ता की जंग में जीत का निर्धारण भले ही अदालत से बाहर हो जाए, लेकिन अब दलों को बदलने के लिए न्यायिक पहल जरूरी है। राजनेताओं को भी अब फाइव स्टार होटलों की कैद से बाहर निकलकर क़ानून से जुड़ना होगा, तभी संवैधानिक लोकतंत्र के प्रति जनता का भरोसा भी बढ़ेगा।

(ये लेखक के अपने विचार हैं, लेखक विराग गुप्ता सुप्रीम कोर्ट मे अधिवक्ता हैं )

Virag Gupta is Lawyer at Supreme Court and Writer working for Inclusive Growth & Social Transformation through Judicial Reforms & Youth Participation.

Writer : Rekha Sharma, Former High court Judge

Allegations of sexual harassment were levelled against Justice Gogoi by an ex-staffer of the Court. The allegations were damning, but equally disturbing was the response of the CJI — one of panic. Instead of constituting a sexual harassment committee, he constituted a special bench of the Court on the advice of the Solicitor General, comprising three judges to address the issue which was purely personal to him. Worse still, he himself presided over that bench ignoring the fundamental jurisprudential principle, Nemo judax in causa sua — no one can be a judge in his own cause.

In a special sitting, which was held on a Court holiday, the chief justice rubbished the allegations and alluded to some larger conspiracy to destabilise the office of the Chief Justice of India. He also talked about his meagre bank balance and unblemished record, even though no one had questioned his financial or professional integrity. The bench did not pass any order on the issue except to advise the media that given the sensitivities of the matter, it should exercise restraint.

After the special bench, an in-house panel of three judges was formed to examine whether the allegations warranted an inquiry. The formation of the panel was objected to by the complainant, and also by some independent voices. One of the judges from within the SC was reported to have expressed the view that the panel should have been more broad-based — that it should have included an external member and the complainant should have been allowed the assistance of a lawyer. The complainant, who initially participated in the proceedings, walked out of the same raising various objections to the procedure adopted by the panel, including denial of assistance of a lawyer to her. However, the panel proceeded and concluded its inquiry, eventually exonerating the chief justice.

Transparency in matters of appointment to the higher judiciary has been a casualty during Justice Gogoi’s tenure: Under his stewardship, a judge who was a junior by 32 notches was appointed to the SC, ignoring the all-India seniority levels of others. As gathered from the SC website, the only reason assigned for ignoring the others was that the one chosen was found to be more meritorious. However, later, at least two of those ignored were made chief justices of high courts, and were also brought to the SC. This indicates that the two later appointees were equally deserving, and yet, were overlooked at a given point in time. More recently, the collegium recommended Justice Akil Kureshi of the Gujarat High Court as the chief justice of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. The government reportedly did not agree with the recommendation. The collegium, instead of reiterating its initial recommendation, changed their original stance and recommended him to the Tripura High Court.

In the aftermath of the abrogation of Article 370, a number of habeas corpus petitions concerning the personal liberty of citizens were filed: These were routinely adjourned on the mere plea of the state that there has to be a balance between personal liberty of an individual and national security. It is nobody’s case that those detained should have been set free, but considering that individual liberties were at stake, if nothing else, they were at least entitled to an urgent hearing. Justice Gogoi, while delivering the third Ramnath Goenka Memorial Lecture on ‘Vision of Justice’, said that the judiciary “is the last bastion of hope and the one that the citizenry believes firmly will give justice to them, come what may”. The words sound hollow.

To be fair, Justice Gogoi took the bull by the horns in hearing and deciding the decades-old Ayodhya dispute. The judgment brings closure to the most controversial issue of present-day India. Thus, the tenure of the chief justice, which started with a whimper, has ended with a bang.

This article first appeared in the print edition on November 20, 2019 under the title ‘Hits and misses’ in the Indian Express Newspapar . The writer is a former judge of the Delhi High Court. Views are personal.